Introduction
During the Polish-Ukrainian War over Eastern Galicia in 1919, and the Polish-Soviet War 1919-1921, the theatre of military operations being carried out at that time was divided into an operational area, and a staging area -that provided direct logistical support for the fighting armies. A staging area consists of Staging Districts, which in a sense were equivalent to military provinces. Civil administrative authority in the Staging District area was, to a large extent, subordinated to military administration. Staging Districts, in the same manner as operational military forces, were subordinated to the General Command Headquarters of the Polish Army. Located in the territory not covered by military operations, the so-called national area was then subordinated to the Ministry of Military Affairs. The restored Polish Army modelled the organisation of its staging system, most of all, on Austrian-Hungarian solutions 1 . General Districts were functioning within territories that were not directly affected by military confrontation. The only role it played was administrative. Its range of competencies did not extend to civil administration as it was to be utilised only within said staged areas. Whereas on a state level, civil authority was exercised by the state goverment and local, self-governing units. The term army in the field was understood to mean those mobilised and concentrated armies fighting against the enemy, i. e. combat units, units of uniformed services, and those facilities located within the operational and staging theatre -the so-called area of "the army in the field". It was divided into areas of particular armies, and these in turn comprised an operational area, as well as a staging area at the front lines rearguard, which along its rear border adjoined the area of the country known as the "Hinterland". This was, in turn, subordinated (in regards to military issues) to the minister of war and the national defence ministers of both Austria and Hungary, ibidem. 
Political and military situation in Vilnius
Vilnius was the historic seat of Lithuanian statehood. Even before the rebirth of the Polish state, Vilnius -as well as the Vilnius Region -were both polonised and were the objects of territorial disputes. The Bolsheviks too showed their interest in Vilnius as the potential capital of a Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. Even during the German occupation, Polish authorities were seeking an agreement with the Germans regarding the safe passage of Polish troops through to Vilnius. After a few days, in which a local self-defence group assumed control in Vilnius, the Bolsheviks had established their own government. For Poland and, most probably, Belarus and Ukraine also, regaining Vilnius was the first step toward realizing the ideal of a political federation of Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). The main purpose of such a federation was to ensure a mutual defensive stance was adopted against Bolshevik Russia. It also assumed that the federation would partake in a coordinated foreign policy. The Lithuanians did not accept either the Polish federation or its concept of incorporation 3 . The Polish Army's first move towards regaining control over Lithuanian-belarusian lands in the East, was to reestablish command over the city. Hence, the occupation of Vilnius was a great opportunity to reinstate Polish rule in the Vilnius and Grodno regions. What is more, Piłsudski was particularly sentimental about his native land. The choices that had been made by the Lithuanian nation (the option for a Lithuanian or Polish state) were essentially political, as opposed to cultural. For centuries the cultures of both nations had been shared. Emergent Lithuanian nationalism did, however, choose not to recognise any political compromises for fear of the Polish state's strength and its rights to the disputed territories. Poland was also concerned about the wellbeing of ethnic Poles living within Lithuanian lands 4 th April. The military operation, conducted upon the territory of Lithuania, proved the next step in a decades-long process of events, taking place within said ethnic borderlands. The idea driving the Vilna Offensive focussed upon regaining Vilnius through the use of cavalry. During the offensive Polish forces also secured the nearby cities of Lida, Baranovichy and Novogrudok, and this resulted in the rear being secured for the battle. The aforenoted military operations were supported by a division of infantry. Whilst Polish nationals were in support of the Polish Army, the Jewish community remained hostile. Amongst others, the Vilnius railwaymen from "Kaziuki" (St. Kazimierz Association) sided with the Polish forces. The 1 st Legion Infantry division and cavalry played a central role in the battles to regain the city. By 21
st April the takeover of Vilnius had been completed. In the evening of 21 st April, the First Marshal of Poland Józef Piłsudski had visited the city of Vilnius 6 . In the eastern areas of the Polish state being created at that time, apart from military administration, most of all, civil administration functioned. Towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants appointed a mayor. This happened in Bialystok, Grodno, Vilnius, Brest-Litowsk and Kovel, or other locations. The General Commissioner (the LithuanianBelarusian Department) appointed a government commissioner supervising municipal administration. In the aforementioned cities and towns, security was provided by a municipal police force. or keeping order had an obligation to cooperate directly with the military chief officers of the prefectures (a fortress, a town / city). In operational areas, due to the closeness of the front line and military operations being performed, they could not be included in a standard administration, all administrative regulations were issued by staging commissioners following consultations with the military command. Whereas the matters of railway, post offices and telegraph communications belonged exclusively to the army 7 . The cities of Vilnius and Minsk constituted separate administrative units equal to districts that were governed by civil administration commissioners reporting to district governors. A civil administration commissioner held their office, with office personnel assigned to them, and through the police subordinated to them 8 . A civil commissioner's scope of duties comprised the management of population movement, issuing passports and passes, determining the times of curfews, supervising over the right to bear arms in town, supervising requisitions of living quarters and private property and underground waters and sanitary supervision. The commissioner watched over paying benefits to the families of the soldiers of the Polish Army 9 .
In the operational area of the army (but already at the rear of the front line) Staging Districts functioned, whose main task was to support operational and combat capabilities of armies located on the front. Stage Districts were entirely responsible for organising the facilities on the Polish-Russian (previously Polish-Ukranian) front. The staging troops guarded the lines of communication, combated banditry, and also were involved in quartermaster activities. The region of the staging district was run by the army, in cooperation with the civil administration. Staging districts, that were created by the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires during World War I, were in operation right across the territory of Central and Eastern Europe during this period. Gebiet des Oberbefehlshabers Ost -Ober-Ost was one of the staging districts that controlled the area that had included Vilnius.
Polish staging soldiers performed specific military services. It was tough and, due to the limited numbers of soldiers available, they often had to be on duty for number of consecutive days. Similarly, there was shortage of experienced officers. Bad road conditions, and the lack of a suitable means of transportation, proved additional obstacles. Staging units had to prevent robbery attempts on the line infantry units, heading to and from the front-line.
Staginge troops were also responsible for requisitioning, as well as confiscating, illegal weaponery from civilians. Cases of brutal requisitioning are known to have taken place Ibid., Art. 4. in Ukraine and Belarus, however the author of this paper hasn't come across the proof of such events in the Vilnius region. Though military and civil authorities had separate competencies, they had regular clashes within the zone of conflict. This was primarily due to the military authorities having no consideration for civil authorities and claiming it as their right to hold power over the entire warzone. Such cooperation is the subject of a book by prof. Joanna Gierowska Kałłaur 10 15 . In March 1920 a reorganisation of the operational structure of the Polish Army took place. Armies were created and Headquarters of Staging Districts assigned to them. Behind the front line, reserves were concentrated and subordinated to the General Command HQ of the Polish Army. The Headquarters of the Staging Districts were dissolved in: Lvov, Grodno, Lublin and Kovel creating Headquarters of Staging Districts assigning 13 16 . There were plans to incorporate Vilnius in the national area, so the staging command unit had to be maintained only in a basic structure without creating staging prefectures within that area. Where possible, HQ Staging Districts were established in the same locations as the Army Headquarters to which they were subordinated, irrespective of their names. . Pursuant to the order of the General Command HQ No. 8000. IV due to the liquidation of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Division and determination of command of armies, and according to an order issued by the General Command HQ 1980. And establishing new positions for the Staging District Command HQ, the Army Command HQ indicated within the boundaries of the Staging District HQ a dividing line in the war area, a staging district from an operational area as a close area of military operations. In the operational area of the army a Staging District HQ did not hold any competences, authority was held by headquarters of divisions, brigades or operational groups. The operational area was to stretch for a days march through the first line of the front (not further than 30 km). The war theatre subordinated to the General Headquarters in the territory of the former When there were plans to exclude the District from the war theatre, staging prefectures were transformed into staging stations. In a political prefecture of war area, staging service and military territorial authority was performed by the Staging Prefecture Command HQ, whose scope of operations covered the protection of the area and order maintenance at the rear of the operating army with staging military units or combat units temporarily subordinated to them 24 . As a result of inspections performed in the command HQs of Oshmyany, Vileyka and Molodechno staging prefectures, the Commander of the Vilnius Staging District came to the conclusion that the poor conditions of these prefectures resulted from improperly performed service. From four subordinated prefectures, only in one instance had the situation proved satisfactory to the commander (Oshmyany Prefecture). In the remaining counties commanders fulfilled their duties in an improper manner 25 . An organisational level of the staging area lower than staging counties were staging stations subordinated to a staging command or to a staging county command, and indirectly to Branch III. Staging stations appointed command headquarters having consulted the process with the HQ Staging District in more relevant places within its own area. Staging stations were created by commanders of staging prefectures at the main communication lines. The staff of a staging station could not be made up of more than 3 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers, 5 rank-and-file soldiers and a staging company platoon. In practice, it was not fully staffed due to a painful lack of staging soldiers and officers as well as non-commissioned officers able to perform administrative service 26 . Staging districts were assigned military regiments in the form of staging battalions. They assumed their names from the General Districts where they were formed and were assigned a subsequent order number. They had the same number of soldiers as an infantry battalion without a company of machine guns. Soldiers with poorer health, those older and unable to serve on the front, and the more poorly armed served in these military regiments. As a rule, staging battalions were not allowed to be sent to serve at the front. However, they took part in fighting in the Ukrainian campaign during the retreat and in fights at the turn of July and August in 1920, in the so-called Battle of Warsaw and the Battle on the Bug. Their combat value was different. It depended on the fighting capacity of soldiers themselves, but most of all, on how the battalions were used. If they were performing their tasks independently against strong enemy units, they were quickly destroyed, very often entering into panic that also overcame other soldiers. If they were fighting next to strong line units and achieved successes, their value was not very often lower than other front-line combat units.
The Most volunteers were inhabitants of Vilnius. The main recruitment point was located in that time. Volunteers from neighbouring counties incorporated the local county companies or other sub-units serving there 36 . The Staging battalions subordinated to the Vilnius Staging District HQ but, due to large deficiencies in supply and equipment, could not perform tasks they had been assigned. The most important facilities in the HQ Staging District Vilnius were not properly guarded. The Military Police posts were located as far as 30 km from each other, which was a huge distance due to the poor condition of the local transport routes 37 . The army and civilians were subject to the Military Police that came under the competence of military authorities, and were given specific security duties within the warzone. It cooperated with the civil authorities in regard to the civilian populace. All local civil organisations that existed under security forces within the war area, were subordinated to the Military Police, as the assisting authorities. The exception was the "municipal police" in poviat towns (land counties). Every frontline Headquarter or operational group had its own front Branch of Military Police established. In the staging area of each district there was a branch of Military Police that a Staging District had set up. police were divided into: a front-line and field staging force. The latter functioned as if it were border control, by separating the country from the war zones using cordons 38 42 . The opinions on staging military police guards radically differed; though they were mostly negative unfortunately. Particularly negative opinions were issued about the military police of Vilnius and the county of Vilnius. There were complaints about the guards' brutality, arbitrary detentions, the stealing of items from detained persons, or indeed beatings. In autumn 1919 investigations were conducted, and as a result of which most of the charges were confirmed 43 . A problem with the operation of the Vilnius military police appeared already during the recruitment process, since local criminals involved in muggings and thefts were conscripted, and those people -knowing that it was possible to continue their criminal actions -recommend their companions to serve in the police 44 . Specific units, military in nature, operating in the logistic support area of the front were: The Railway Guard Service and the Voluntary Legion of Women. The Railway Guard Service dealt with watching over railway facilities and railway lines adequately to their numbers and means. In the middle of October 1919 the manpower of the Lithuanian-Belarusian battalion of the Railway Guard Service comprised 603 guards divided into 5 companies. The battalion's commander was Major Korwin-Kamieński, and the battalion was located in Vilnius at Kazimierz corner in the house of 'The League of Workers'. The Railway guards were equipped and had uniforms not suitable for the duties they performed. Their equipment, apart from shoes and foot-clouts, were made from nettles and cellulose and were not fit for use. Uniforms made from nettle fibres broke apart in a very short time. Carrying out their service, at railway lines so important for the army, they had different kinds of weapons, which could have lead to tragic th October 1920, before coming across the Lithuanian forces. The Polish units had a camparative advantage over their opponents. The Lithuanians, following the commands of the government in Kaunas, made a decision to pass the city over to its Entente representatives. A delegate of the Lithuanian government in Vilnius, Ignacy Jonynas passed control over the city to the Entente resident colonel, Constantin Reboul. Such a movement was supposed to enable the Polish forces to retake power within Vilnius without the apparent action against Entente. The Lithuanians struggled to acknowledge Polish authority in Vilnius. Initially they attempted direct armed action in response to Żeligowski's mutiny. At the end of October 1920 they moved on to offensive manouveurs. The battle near Giedraičiai was stopped as a result of an intervention by the League of Nations. However, the fighting over the Vilnius region did not stop there, and on 21 st November 1920 the League of Nations ordered an end to hostility, and a truce was created between all the involved parties 58 .
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Central Lithuania was proclaimed after the Vilniuregion was taken over by Polish forces. The organisation of its Armed forces was based on territorial system. The central area of the Vilnius region was divided into two military districts: I the Vilnius Region District and the II Grodno District. Each of them provided one corps, which consisted of two infantry brigades, a cavalry unit, as well as sufficient quantity of artillery and auxiliary units. The Vilnius Region was divided into several areas: Vilnius, Trakai, Švenčionys and Braslav, whereas Grodno District encompassed Grodno, Lida, Ashmyany and Varėna areas 59 . A Command Headquarters and an Inspectorate were established. The territory of Central Lithuania was divided into 5 staging districts: Rzesza (Didžioji Riešė), Bieniakony, Švenčionys, Oshmyany and Trakai. The western border of the Trakai district ran along the front-line, whereas eastern border of Švenčionys and Ashmyany districts was described by Soviet-Lithuanian treaty. Suchh staging districts were to secure to the territory, provide protection to important communication points such as bridges, crossroads. Also in its competence was to secure ralway tracks, roads maintanance so that any military machinery and equipment required by the army could be easily supplied. The Headquarters of the staging districts also dealt with civilians complaints in regards to any military requisitions. They also helped the civil authorities quash banditry by providing military units when needed 60 . On 20 th February 1922, the Vilnius Sejm voted to incorporate the Republic of Poland.
Conclusion
Headquarters of Staging Districts formed a relevant component of military administration during the Polish-Bolshevik War. They were an intermediate area between the operational area, where combat operations were being performed, and the national area i.e. General Districts subordinated already to the authority of the Ministry of Military Affairs. They functioned only during a war time. During a peace time, after the completion of the Polish-Bolshevik War Staging Districts were liquidated, and staging military units demobilised. Staging Districts subordinated to the General Headquarters and General Districts subjected to the Ministry of Military Affairs were replaced during the organisation of the Polish Army during a peace time by Headquarters of Army Corps District. Efficient operation of the front was dependant on the operation of the staging area i.e. immediate logistic support of the front. Vilnius Staging District Command HQ was a special administrative entity. Initially Vilnius and its neighbourhoods formed part of Staging Districts Bialystok and Volkovysk, and only later on became its headquarters. The most important staging institutions were located in Vilnius. Whereas staging services in 59 KRAJEWSKI, Zenon. Geneza i dzieje wewnętrzne Litwy Środkowej (1920) (1921) (1922) . Lublin, 1996, s. 79.
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the field was very difficult due to a communication situation in the territory of Lithuania. The lack of roads and staging units small in numbers could not fulfil their duties in a proper manner. It especially related to military guard units whose outposts were apart from each other for as much as 30 km. Staging plants comprised warehouses, sanitary and health care units, prisoners-of-war's units, i.e. everything that had to function at the rear so that operational armies maintain its combat capacity.
Operational armies did not pay attention to stagings. During fighting and manoeuvring the role of logistic support was neglected. In staging battalions soldiers served who were unable to perform service on the front. Staging battalions were banned to take part in fighting on the front, not only due to a poor quality of a recruit and poor training of soldiers, but also due to the lack of proper armaments. The Vilnius Staging District was located in the territory of Lithuania, yet the Vilnius region had been largely polonised. Despite being in the state of war with Lithuania, no major political or social disturbances took place. That proved quite the opposite to the situation unfolding upon Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, where the anxieties behind the front-line almost culminated in an uprising. Part of the eastern regions Staging Districts Command HQ remained under the influence of the Bolsheviks. Also banditry proved increasingly prescient. The situation within Vilnius Region was much calmer.
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su šaltinių problema. Kariuomenės susitelkimo vietų dokumentuose yra aprašomi bendrieji organizaciniai reikalai, o didelė dalis kasdienio gyvenimo dokumentų turi mažą istorinę vertę. Labai trūksta atsiminimų ir dienoraščių, aprašančių tarnybos sąlygas ir kariuomenės susitelkimo vietų funkcionavimą. Šioms pajėgoms trūko vieningumo dvasios -esprit de corps, kurią turėjo fronto linijoje kovojantys kariai.
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